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NOTE
No Wrongful Death Recovery for a Viable Unborn Fetus in North Carolina:
DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
INTRODUCTION
At common law, a cause of action for wrongful death was not recog-
nized.' Today all American jurisdictions have enacted statutes that cre-
ate a right to recover for wrongful death.2 The courts, however, continue
to reach conflicting results in the treatment of recovery for the wrongful
death of a fetus3 injured en ventre sa mere (in its mother's womb).4 Orig-
inally, no right of recovery for "prenatal"5 injuries was recognized by the
courts. 6 Although such recovery was eventually allowed, the circum-
stances under which the right was granted varied among the
jurisdictions.7
In April, 1986, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided the case
of DiDonato v. Wortman.8 The court held that there can be no cause of
action for the wrongful death of a viable9 child en ventre sa mere, pursu-
ant to section 28A-18-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 10
This Note will examine the DiDonato decision and its two-pronged ap-
proach to the issue of a wrongful death action for a viable unborn fetus.
Part I presents the facts of the DiDonato v. Wortman case. Part II dis-
cusses the history of wrongful death actions, with particular emphasis on
wrongful death recovery in North Carolina. In addition, the develop-
1. Note, Wrongful Death: O'Grady v. Brown [654 S. W.2d 904 (Mo.)], Recovery for Wrongful
Death of a Viable Fetus in Missouri, 52 UMKC L. REV. 692, 693 (1984).
2. Id. at 696.
3. The word "fetus" is medically defined as "the product of conception from the end of the
eighth week to the moment of birth." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 521 (24th ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as STEDMAN'S].
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BLACK'S].
5. "Preceding birth," STEDMAN'S, supra note 3, at 1134.
6. Note, Recovery for Wrongful Death of a Stillborn Fetus Examined, 21 VILL. L. REV. 994,
994 (1976).
7. Id.
8. 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
9. The word "viable" 'denotes a fetus sufficiently developed to live outside of the uterus.
STEDMAN'S, supra note 3, at 1551.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) reads in pertinent part:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another, such as
would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the
person or corporation that would have been so liable,.. shall be liable to an action for
damages....
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ment of wrongful death actions for viable unborn fetuses is traced. Part
III analyzes the DiDonato decision with special attention to its reliance
upon the speculative nature of pecuniary damages and the statutory
meaning of "person." This Note concludes that the present trend in the
United States indicates that North Carolina should, either judicially or
legislatively, change its laws to reflect the majority view allowing recov-
ery for the wrongful death of a viable unborn fetus.
I. THE CASE
A. Facts
In March, 1982, thirty-six-year-old Norma DiDonato became preg-
nant and was examined by defendants Drs. William Wortman and John
Hart.'" Dr. Wortman had treated Norma DiDonato since 1973 and was
aware of her family history of diabetes and her long history of infertility.
Nevertheless, Dr. Wortman diagnosed Mrs. DiDonato's pregnancy as
"no risk."' 2 The delivery date was set for October 12, 1982. t"
On October 26, 1982 (two weeks after the predicted due date), Mrs.
DiDonato was given a non-stress test at her own insistence, the results of
which indicated that the baby was viable, healthy and reactive and could
have been born alive if labor had been induced at that time. 14 Mrs.
DiDonato was admitted to the hospital on October 30, 1982, at which
time no fetal heartbeat could be detected. After a pelvic examination it
was determined that the DiDonato baby was no longer alive.' 5 Mrs.
DiDonato underwent a Caesarean section delivery of a stillborn twelve-
pound, eleven-ounce male fetus.1
6
B. Trial Court
Plaintiff Anthony DiDonato, as administrator of the estate of his still-
born son, Joseph, filed a wrongful death action in Superior Court, Meck-
lenburg County.' 7 He alleged that because of the family history of
diabetes and the presence of increased levels of blood sugar in Norma
11. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58
(1986) (No 8SC1015 Mecklenburg County).
12. Id.
13. Id. Between June 30, 1982 and September 20, 1982 chemical analyses of Mrs. DiDonato's
urine revealed the presence of sugar. The finding was recorded on her pregnancy chart and circled.
At no time did Wortman or Hart advise Mrs. DiDonato that her due date had been revised from
October 12, 1982. Furthermore, the significance of the presence of sugar in her urine or how that
fact would affect the health of the fetus and the delivery was never discussed. Mrs. DiDonato was
not placed on any medication nor was she advised about any type of glucose tolerance test or any
other procedure routinely utilized for diagnosing a diabetic condition. Id. at 3-4.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 117, 341 S.E.2d at 58.
2
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DiDonato's blood, the defendants should have, in the exercise of reason-
able care, diagnosed and recognized her diabetic condition."8 The baby
should have been delivered before it outgrew its blood and oxygen supply
as a consequence of the high blood sugar level. Their failure to do so
allegedly resulted in the wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate. 19
Defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful death claim pursuant to
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under the North Carolina
Wrongful Death Act.2 0 The court granted the motion, and the plaintiff
appealed. E'
C. Appellate Court
In affirming the trial court's dismissal, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the issue of a wrongful death action for a viable un-
born fetus is one more appropriately for legislative attention and not for
judicial intervention.22 The court reached its holding by looking at the
speculative nature of pecuniary damages as set out by the North Carolina
Supreme Court and the statutory definition of "person" as interpreted by
the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Wrongful Death Act
The development of the present North Carolina Wrongful Death Act
has been a long and complex process. The creation of an action for
wrongful death can be traced to dissatisfaction with two ancient rules
which prohibited recovery for civil injury amounting to death. 23 The
first rule, which originated in 1607, basically held that if a tort amounted
to a felony, the injured party's right of action was barred.24 The felony
rule later influenced 2' Lord Ellenborough to lay down a broader com-
mon law rule which, in essence, stated that in a civil court, the death of a
human being cannot be complained of as an injury.26 Because these rules
18. Id. at 117, 341 S.E.2d at 59.
19. Id. at 118, 341 S.E.2d at 59.
20. Brief, supra note 11, at 2; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
21. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 117, 341 S.E.2d at 58.
22. Id. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 60.
23. See generally 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 334 (5th ed. 1973).
24. Id. at 331 [hereinafter referred to as "the felony rule"].
25. Authorities are not sure exactly how the influence occurred but the influence is suggested in
Osborn v. Gillett, 8 L.R.-Ex 96 (1873).
26. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808) (plaintiff was allowed recovery for the
death after suing the owners of an overturned stagecoach for the death of his wife). Lord Ellenbor-
ough was sitting at nisi prius.
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prohibited recovery in civil actions for the injury or death of a person,
plaintiffs normally went uncompensated for the loss caused by the acts of
tortfeasors."
In response to the harshness of the common law rule, Lord Campbell's
Act28 was enacted in 1846 allowing recovery by personal representatives
suing for the wrongful death of another. In the United States, statutes
modeled after Lord Campbell's Act were adopted by legislatures in the
late 1840's.29 One of the first such statutes was enacted in New York in
1847.30 The statute contained substantially the same provisions as Lord
Campbell's Act and created a cause of action for losses sustained by
named beneficiaries by reason of death.
All jurisdictions now allow actions for wrongful death.3" The statutes
of the different jurisdictions assume several forms but fall generally into
three classes: (1) statutes allowing recovery for damages sustained by
named beneficiaries, (2) statutes allowing recovery for damages sustained
by the decedent's estate, and (3) statutes allowing recovery against the
estate of the deceased person. 32 The North Carolina wrongful death stat-
ute falls within the first class.
B. Wrongful Death Recovery in North Carolina
Eight years after the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act,33 the North
Carolina Legislature enacted a statute modeled after the English stat-
ute.34 The statute then enacted is now incorporated into section 28A-18-
27. Both rules were later modified in that they suspended the right of an action in tort until
prosecution but did not destroy it. Thus, the modification was the first suggestion of dissatisfaction
with the rules. HOLDWORTH, supra note 23, at 334.
28. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93. The Act provided:
That whenever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect or Default, and
the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the part
injured to maintain an Action or recover Damages in respect thereof, then and not ensued shall
be liable to an Action for Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured... every
such Action shall be brought by and in the Name of the Executor or Administrator of the
Person deceased....
29. See Comment, Torts-The Right of Recovery For the Tortious Death of the Unborn, 27
How. L.J. 1649 (1984).
30. N.Y. EXECUTORS LAW § 450 (McKinney 1847).
31. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 2D at 29"(2d ed. 1975).
32. 3 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 337 (4th ed. 1974).
33. Lord Campbell's Act, ch. 93.
34. The statute provided:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act of another person, and
the wrongful act is such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, and
recover damages in respect thereof, if death had not ensued, then and in every such case, the
person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount to felony law.
Be it further enacted, That every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the
personal representative of the deceased, and the amount recovered in every such action, shall be
disposed of according to the statute for the distribution of personal property in case the jury
4
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2 of the North Carolina General Statutes.35
The statute, by express language, limits recovery to "such damages as
are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from
such death."36 It does not provide for the assessment of punitive dam-
ages, nor does the statute provide for the allowance of nominal damages
in the absence of pecuniary lOSS.
3 7
The North Carolina wrongful death statute has from its passage been
interpreted to accord with the interpretation given by the English courts
to Lord Campbell's Act: "If they bring an action and prove no loss,
actual or prospective, the defendant is entitled to the verdict."38 In 1867,
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
The reason why, at common law, an action against a trespasser died with
the person was, that it was not so much an action for pecuniary loss, as it
was for a solatium 39 for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff, and for the
punishment of the defendant. But the plaintiff could not be solaced, nor
the defendant punished after death. But our statute, which gives an ac-
tion to the representative of a deceased party, who was injured or slain by
a trespasser, confines the recovery to the amount of pecuniary injury. It
does not contemplate solatium for the plaintiff, nor punishment for the
defendant. It is therefore in the nature of pecuniary demand, the only
question being, how much has the plaintiff lost by the death of the person
injured.4°
Any recovery for wrongful death must be based on actionable negli-
gence or misconduct, under the general rules of tort liability, and the
action must be asserted in strict conformity with the statute.41
In 1969, the North Carolina Legislature completely rewrote the
wrongful death statute, making extensive changes;42 the most considera-
may give such damages as they deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury result-
ing from such death: within one year from the death of such deceased person.
Be it further enacted, That the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclu-
sive and sole benefit of the widow and issue of deceased, in all cases where they are surviving.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39 (1855).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Reeves v. Hill, 272 N.C. 352, 360, 158 S.E.2d 529, 535 (1968).
38. Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 632, 101 S.E.2d 793, 794 (1958).
39. Defined as: "Damages allowed for injury to the feelings." BLACK'S, supra note 4, at 1248.
40. Armentrout, 247 N.C. at 633, 101 S.E.2d at 795 (quoting Collier v. Arrington, 61 N.C. 356,
358 (1867)) (emphasis in original).
41. 5 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3d at 3.
42. The current wrongful death statute reads:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another,
such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages
therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so liable, and his or their personal
representatives or collectors, shall be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the
personal representatives or collector of the decedent; and this notwithstanding the death, and
although the wrongful act, neglect or default, causing the death, amounts in law to a felony.
The personal representative or collector of the decedent who pursues an action under this sec-
tion may pay from the assets of the estate the reasonable and necessary expenses, not including
5
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ble of which allowed recovery of punitive as well as nominal damages.
Aside from a 1984 amendment, the current statute remains unchanged.43
C. History of a Cause of Action for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus
At common law, a fetus was not recognized apart from its mother as a
"person" having standing to bring suit." Four major cases have estab-
lished the history of a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus.45
The first recorded case in which the issue of the rights of an unborn arose
was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton.46 The case involved a
wrongful death action by a woman, who, during her fourth or fifth
month of pregnancy, slipped upon a defect in a highway of the defendant
town. The fall resulted in the miscarriage of her child who died a few
attorneys' fees, incurred in pursuing the action. At the termination of the action, any amount
recovered shall be applied first to the reimbursement of the estate for the expenses incurred in
pursuing the action, then to the payment of attorneys' fees, and shall then be distributed as
provided in this section. The amount recovered in such action is not liable to be applied as
assets, in the payment of debts or legacies, except as to burial expenses of the deceased, and
reasonable hospital and medical expenses not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars
($1,500) incident to the injury resulting in death; provided that all claims filed for such services
shall be approved by the clerk of superior court and any party adversely affected by any decision
of said clerk as to said claim may appeal to the superior court in term time, but shall be dis-
posed of as provided in the Intestate Succession Act.
(b) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the injury re-
sulting in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to re-
ceive the damages recovered, including but not limited to compensation for the loss
of the reasonably expected:
a. Net income of the decedent,
b. Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether volun-
tary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the damages recovered,
c. Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of
the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he survived,
and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the decedent through mali-
ciousness, wilful or wanton injury, or gross negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.
(c) All evidence which reasonably tends to establish any of the elements of damages included in
subsection (b), or otherwise reasonably tends to establish the present monetary value of the decedent
to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered, is admissible in an action for damages for
death by wrongful act.
(d) In all actions brought under this section the dying declarations of the deceased shall be
admissible as provided for in G.S. 8-51.1.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
43. The 1984 amendment raised the burial expenses exclusion from $500 to $1,500.
44. Note, A Wrongful Death Action Can Be Maintainedfor Prenatal Injuries Causing the Still-
born ofa Fetus: Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, 697S. W.2d 636 (Tex. App. 1985),
17 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 983, 985 (1986).
45. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 58 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp.
138 (D.D.C. 1946); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 IIl. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v. Inhabit-
ants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
46. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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minutes after birth. An action was brought to recover damages "for the
further benefit of the mother."47 Justice Holmes, speaking for the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court, stated the opinion that was followed for the
next sixty years-an unborn child incapable of surviving a premature
birth is not a separate entity and therefore is not a person in its own
right.
48
In another early decision in this area, the Illinois Supreme Court in
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,49 denied recovery to a child for prenatal
injuries received within ten days of his delivery date. ° The court, relying
on Dietrich, held that as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the
time of the injury, the child could not be allowed to maintain an action
for injuries occasioned before its birth.5 The Dietrich-Allaire rationale
was followed in the United States until 1946, when the two cases were
eventually reversed due to the criticism surrounding their outcome.
52
. In Bonbrest v. Kotz,53 the court broke the ground for allowing recovery
for prenatal injuries where the child is born alive. In Bonbrest, a viable
fetus was injured in the process of removal from its mother's womb and
only survived for a short time thereafter due to the defendants' alleged
professional malpractice.54 The Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia distinguished Dietrich by stating that Dietrich involved an in-
jury transmitted to a fetus through its mother whereas the Bonbrest court
was considering a direct injury to a viable fetus.55 The court rejected the
".single entity" view and held that a child, if born alive and viable, should
be allowed to maintain an action for injuries wrongfully committed upon
its person in the womb of its mother.56
All American jurisdictions now allow recovery by a surviving child for
prenatal injuries.57 After a court has recognized that a cause of action
for prenatal injuries will lie in cases where the child survives birth, it
would be reasonable for courts to take the next step and recognize a
cause of action for prenatal injuries resulting in death when the child was
47. Id. at 15.
48. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 16.
49. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
50. Id. at 360, 56 N.E. at 638.
51. Id. at 366, 56 N.E. at 640.
52. Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire argued for recovery based on the viability of the fetus. He
stated:
If at that period a child so advanced is so injured in its limbs or members and is born into the
living world suffering from the effects of the injury, is it not sacrificing truth to a mere theoreti-
cal abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the mother?
Allaire, 184 Ill. at 370, 56 N.E.2d at 641.
53. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
54. Id. at 139.
55. Id. at 140.
56. Id. at 142.
57. Note, supra note 1, at 696.
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born alive." Many courts, however, limit recoveries to injuries sustained
after viability.59 Criticism of this viability requirement has led some ju-
risdictions to allow recovery for injuries sustained at any time after
conception. 6°
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Verkennes v. Corniea6 1 was the first
to allow a wrongful death recovery for the death of a viable, but stillborn
fetus. In Verkennes, the father of the unborn alleged that a negligently
supervised delivery resulted in the death of a viable fetus and its
mother. 2 The court relied on the rationale of Justice Boggs' dissent in
Allaire and on the Bonbrest opinion, and held that "where independent
existence is possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act, a cause
of action arises . *"63 The court deemed the viable fetus an independ-
ent entity that was owed a duty of care separate and apart from that
owed to the expectant mother.64
State courts are currently divided on whether to allow an action for
the wrongful death of a viable fetus. Today, an overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions addressing the issue allow recovery. As of 1985, thirty-
three jurisdictions allow an action to be maintained for the wrongful
death of a viable fetus.65 These courts recognize that a viable fetus is
biologically independent. They support their decisions with two basic
arguments: "(1) that such a cause of action is a natural extention of the
rule that recovery is allowed for prenatal injuries when the child is born
alive, and (2) that the purpose of a wrongful death act is to provide a
remedy whenever an action could have been brought; provided death had
not ensued, and allowing recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fe-
tus is consistent with that purpose.' '66  Nine jurisdictions, including
North Carolina, deny recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.67
These jurisdictions have denied recovery on one of two different bases,
either that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the statute or
that the losses are too speculative in nature.68 The jurisdictions remain-
ing have not had the opportunity to rule on the issue.6 9
58. Id. at 696-97.
59. Id. at 697; see also supra note 9 (defining "viable").
60. Note, supra note 1, at 697.
61. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
62. Id. The issue was whether the special administrator of the estate of an unborn infant,
which dies prior to birth as the result of another's negligence, has a cause of action on behalf of the
next of kin of said unborn infant under the wrongful death statute. Id. at 367, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
63. Id. at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
64. Id.
65. Note, supra note 46, at 998.
66. Note, supra note I, at 697-98.
67. Id. at 698. The other states include: Arizona, California, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey,
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The landmark decision of Roe v. Wade,7 ° contains one of the few refer-
ences by the United States Supreme Court concerning whether a right of
action for prenatal death exists under applicable tort law.7 In Roe, Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that the word "person,"
as used in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution,
does not include the unborn.7 2 Yet, in dictum, Justice Blackmun ac-
knowledged that "the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that
life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to
the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the
rights are contingent upon live birth."73
D. Treatment of Wrongful Death Actions for the Unborn Fetus in
North Carolina
Although the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act was originally en-
acted in 1854, it was not until 1966 that the court was confronted with
the issue of whether there can be a right of action under the Wrongful
Death Act for the prenatal death of a viable child en ventre sa mere. In
Gay v. Thompson,74 Barbara Gay, on August 23, 1962, was eight months
pregnant, in good health, and the child's condition and growth were nor-
mal. The child was capable of a separate existence outside of the
mother's womb. Mrs. Gay had no symptoms of being in labor, and no
complications existed requiring labor to be induced prematurely.75 How-
ever, upon recommendation of her physician, defendant Dr. Thompson,
she was admitted to the hospital so that Thompson could cause a prema-
ture delivery. In an effort to induce the premature delivery, her amniotic
membranes were ruptured and labor-inducing drugs were administered
for 41 hours without success.76 On the night of August 25, Gay became
ill from an acute infection of the uterus which resulted in her death; her
baby was delivered dead the following afternoon. The complaint alleged
that Thompson's negligence proximately caused Baby Gay's death; that
prior to defendant's negligence Baby Gay was a healthy, normal boy.7 7
The North Carolina Supreme Court cited the particular language of
the Wrongful Death Act limiting recovery to "such damages as are a fair
and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such
death:" 7' The court said that a right of action to recover damages for
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. Id. at 161.
72. Id. at 158.
73. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
74. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
75. Id. at 394-95, 146 S.E.2d at 425-26.
76. Id. at 395, 146 S.E.2d at 426.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 396, 146 S.E.2d at 426-27.
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wrongful death is purely statutory.79 The court further recognized that
although damages in any wrongful death action are to some extent un-
certain and speculative, there are no competent means of measuring the
probable future earnings of the fetus: "It is virtually impossible to pre-
dict whether an unborn child, but for its death, would have been capable
of giving pecuniary benefit to anyone."8 Since there was "pecuniary in-
jury resulting from" the wrongful prenatal death of a viable child en ven-
tre sa mere, the court concluded that there could be no right of action.8'
Two years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Stetson v.
Easterling," in which an infant died, after living only a few months, from
prenatal brain injuries allegedly proximately caused by the negligence of
the attending physicians. The issue in Stetson was whether the adminis-
trator could maintain an action under the Wrongful Death Act to re-
cover for the death of his intestate who, after living only a few months,
died as the result of prenatal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence
of the defendants. 83 The court examined the statutory language which
limits the right of action to "such as would, if the injured person had
lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor."84 The court
first addressed the issue of whether the infant, if he had lived, could have
maintained an action to recover damages on account of injuries he sus-
tained while en ventre sa mere.85 The Stetson court relied on dictum in
Gay and held that the Stetson baby, if he had lived, could have main-
tained an action to recover damages.86 The court then turned to the
main issue: whether the administrator could recover damages for the
wrongful death of his intestate. Using the Gay rationale, the court held
that negligence alone, without "pecuniary injury resulting from such
death," does not create a cause of action; "it would be sheer speculation
to attempt to assess damages as of the time of the alleged negligently
inflicted fatal injuries. '"87
In 1975, the North Carolina Court of Appeals changed the emphasis
from the speculative nature of damages to the statutory meaning of "per-
son" in Cardwell v. Welch.88 In Cardwell, the parents of a viable unborn
79. Id. at 396, 146 S.E.2d at 427.
80. Id. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 428.
81. Id. at 400, 146 S.E.2d at 429.
82. 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
83. Id. at 154-55, 161 S.E.2d at 533.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
85. The court relied on Gay v. Thompson, which said that "[s]ince the child must carry the
burden of infirmity that results from another's tortious act, it is only natural justice that it, if born
alive, be allowed to maintain an action on the ground of actionable negligence." 274 N.C. at 156,
161 S.E.2d at 534.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 156-57, 161 S.E.2d at 534.
88. 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975). The
North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue, holding in Gay v. Thompson that it
216.
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child brought an action to recover damages alleging that the child's
death was caused by placental separation resulting from trauma to the
mother sustained in an automobile collision caused by defendant's negli-
gence.8 9 The issue was whether a viable unborn child whose death is
caused while still in its mother's womb is properly to be considered a
"person" within the meaning of the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act
such that an action may be maintained by an administrator to recover
damages for its wrongful death.90 The court, in affirming the lower
court's decision, denied recovery. Looking at the legislative intent, the
court construed the word "person" to mean one who has become recog-
nized as a person by having been born alive - one who has "attained a
recognized individual identity so as to have become a 'person' as that
word is commonly understood."9  A year later, in Yow v. Nance,92 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals followed Cardwell and held that a via-
ble unborn child whose death was caused while still in its mother's womb
is not to be considered a "person" within the meaning of the Wrongful
Death Act.93
In Stam v. State,94 a North Carolina citizen and taxpayer brought a
declaratory judgment action against the State of North Carolina and
Wake County seeking judgment declaring unlawful appropriation of
state funds by the 1977 session of the General Assembly and use of sup-
plemental county funds to pay for elective, medically unnecessary abor-
tions for indigent women.95 The court of appeals held that a live human
fetus is not a legal "person" within the meaning of article 1, sections 1
and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution which govern equality of
rights of persons and equal protection of laws,96 and thus the state may
provide funds for performance of elective, medically unnecessary. abor-
tions for indigent women.97 The court reasoned that although an unborn
child may be a "person" for some purposes,98 that view is qualified in one
significant respect: live birth is a condition precedent to the exercise of
was not necessary to decide whether a viable child en ventre sa mere, who is born dead, is a person
within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. Gay, 266 N.C. at 402, 146 S.E.2d at 431.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 392, 213 S.E.2d at 383.
91. Id.
92. 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976).
93. Id. at 419-20, 224 S.E.2d at 292.
94. 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), aff'd in relevant part, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d
439 (1981).
95. Id. at 210, 267 S.E.2d at 338.
96. Id. at 214, 267 S.E.2d at 340.
97. Id. at 218, 267 S.E.2d at 342.
98. For example, "[b]y a legal fiction or indulgence, a legal personality is imputed to an unborn
child as a rule of property for all purposes working to his detriment." Id. at 216, 267 S.E.2d at 341
(quoting Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N.C. 152, 154-55, 52 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1949)) (emphasis added by
the Stain court).
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the property rights of the child en ventre sa mere.99 In further support of
its conclusion, the court cited the decision of Roe v. Wade o in which
the United States Supreme Court held that the word "person," as used in
the fourteenth amendment due process clause, does not include the un-
born.1 ° 1 The Supreme Court's reasoning persuaded the North Carolina
Court of Appeals that the word "person" should not have broader mean-
ing in the state constitution than it has in the United States Constitution.
In the 1984 decision of Azzolino v. Dingfelder, "2 the appellate court
was faced with two questions of first impression, namely, whether a cause
of action for "wrongful life" may be maintained and whether a cause of
action for "wrongful birth" may be maintained.° 3 In Azzolino, the par-
ents and siblings of a child born with Down's Syndrome, along with the
child, brought an action against the health service, the physician and the
nurse who provided prenatal care to the mother, for wrongful birth,
wrongful life, and injuries suffered by the minor siblings as a result of the
wrongful birth."°
Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that both the
wrongful life and the wrongful birth claims could be maintained, 10 5 the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the wrongful life claim because
"such claims for relief are not cognizable at law in this jurisdiction," and
reversed the wrongful birth claims "absent a clear mandate by the legis-
lature."' 0 6 Even though the court assumed arguendo that the defendants
owed a duty to the infant in utero as well as to his parents and that the
defendants breached that duty and thereby proximately caused his
birth,' 7 the court failed to find that life, even with severe defects, was an
injury in the legal sense.'0 8
II. ANALYSIS
After the decision in DiDonato v. Wortman,'0 9 North Carolina remains
in the minority of jurisdictions which prohibit wrongful death actions on
behalf of fetuses. 1 0 The North Carolina Court of Appeals in DiDonato
held that the word "fetus" does not mean "person" within the meaning
99. Stain, 47 N.C. App. at 216, 267 S.E.2d at 341.
100. 410 U.S. 113 (1976).
101. Id. at 158.
102. 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 315 N.C. 103, 337
S.E.2d 528 (1985).
103. Id. at 294, 322 S.E.2d at 572-73.
104. Id. at 292-93, 322 S.E.2d at 571.
105. Id. at 303, 322 S.E.2d at 577-78.
106. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 110, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1985).
107. Id. at 108, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
108. Id. at 109, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
109. 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
110. See Note, supra note 1, at 698.
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of the wrongful death statute. The majority gave three reasons for its
holding. First, the court found it was bound by a previous North Caro-
lina Supreme Court decision"' which contained similar facts, and ac-
cording to the doctrine of stare decisis should also follow prior North
Carolina Court of Appeals decisions" 12 expressly addressing the same is-
sue. 1 3 Second, the court did not want to conflict with the United States
Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade." 4 Third, the legislature, rather
than the judiciary, is the branch to expand the meaning of the word "per-
son" to include "fetus" within the meaning of the wrongful death
statute. ' 1 5
Based on the authority of Gay v. Thompson, 1 6 the DiDonato court
held that no cause of action exists on behalf of a fetus for wrongful
death.117 In Gay, the defendant physician's actions caused a pregnant
woman's amniotic membranes to burst and infect the uterus, and as a
result, she died and her baby was stillborn." 8 The court held that no
evidence existed from which to infer pecuniary damages as a result of the
"wrongful prenatal death of a viable child en ventre sa mere; it is all sheer
speculation." " 19
Since Gay did not expressly answer the question of whether a "fetus"
is a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute, the ma-
jority of the DiDonato court appears to give misplaced reliance on Gay.
The issue in Gay arose under North Carolina's former wrongful death
statute, which allowed recovery only for "such damages as are a fair and
just compensation for the pecuniary injury."' 12' According to Gay, the
usual measurement of pecuniary damages, or the probable future earn-
ings of a decedent, such as "mental and physical capabilities, personality
traits, aptitudes and training," were missing when dealing with an un-
born child. 12' Since the pecuniary worth of a fetus could not be mea-
sured, the court in Gay dismissed the action. However, as the dissent in
DiDonato points out, since the amended wrongful death statute excludes
pecuniary worth as the sole basis of recovery, the Gay holding, when
111. See Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
112. See Stam v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), aff'd in relevant part, 302
N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 292, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976); Cardwell v. Welch,
25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
113. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 59-60.
114. Id. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 60.
115. Id.
116. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
117. Id. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 60.
118. Gay, 266 N.C. at 395, 146 S.E.2d at 426.
119. Id. at 402, 146 S.E.2d at 431.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (repealed in 1973 and now replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-
18-2(b) (1984)).
121. Gay, 266 N.C. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting Comment, Developments in the Law of
Prenatal Wrongful Death, 69 DIcK. L. REv. 258, 267 (1965)).
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applied to the facts in DiDonato, provides little justification for the ma-
jority's decision.' 22 Not only may a beneficiary now recover pecuniary
damages but he may recover punitive and nominal damages as well.
Since punitive damages are based on the heinousness of the conduct and
the financial status of the defendant, 123 damages recoverable do not take
on a speculative nature. Indeed, other jurisdictions, in the absence of
specific proof of earning power, have allowed recovery for the destruc-
tion of an unborn child's power to earn money when it can be inferred
that a child would have had such power.
1 24
DiDonato also recognized the United States Supreme Court decision of
Roe v. Wade in holding that a "fetus" is not a "person" within the mean-
ing of the wrongful death statute.' 25 However, in giving advertence to
Roe, DiDonato appears to unnecessarily restrict the meaning of "fetus" to
prohibit a wrongful death action from arising on behalf of a stillborn. In
Roe, a pregnant woman claimed that she had a constitutional right to
terminate her pregnancy. 126 The state asserted that it had a compelling
state interest to protect unborn children.1 27 The Court disagreed with
the state's argument that its compelling state interest, even before viabil-
ity, was to protect the fetus as a "person," as that word is used in the
fourteenth amendment.
28
DiDonato, along with other courts, 12 9 does not appear to examine the
real differences between the wrongful death statute and the fourteenth
amendment and the dissimilar analyses that the provisions warrant. In
Roe, the claim centered around the rights and liberties guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment, thus warranting the Court to balance a funda-
mental right against a compelling state interest. The Court came to its
conclusion after balancing the interests of a pregnant woman's right to
privacy in her decision to terminate her pregnancy against the state's
interest in protecting prenatal life and the health of the mother. At the
state level however, the courts in construing the language of the wrongful
death statute are not to be concerned with such a balancing test but are
interested in effectuating the purpose of the statute. Based on the history
of the North Carolina statute and the enactment of its amendment, the
current statute has a remedial nature, 130 to compensate beneficiaries for
122. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 121-22, 341 S.E.2d at 61.
123. See generally K. REDDEN & L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.4, at 34 (1980).
124. Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970).
125. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 60.
126. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
127. Id. at 156.
128. Id. at 156-57.
129. See, e.g., Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla.
1977); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199
Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977).
130. Christenbury v. Hedrick, 32 N.C. App. 708, 713, 234 S.E.2d 3, 5-6 (1977).
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the loss of their loved one and to punish the tortfeasor. Excluding "fe-
tus" from the meaning of the word "person" contained in the fourteenth
amendment advances a woman's constitutional right to privacy, while
excluding "fetus" from the meaning of the word "person" in the North
Carolina wrongful death statute leaves the beneficiaries uncompensated
for their losses and the tortfeasors unpunished for their wrongs. 13' Does
an injustice occur if the limited holding in Roe is expanded to apply to
the word "person" as contained in the North Carolina Wrongful Death
Act? In the DiDonato decision, it would appear so. in Roe, Justice
Blackmun seems to suggest an injustice would occur, and states in dicta
that the state may protect an unborn in other areas. 32
Again, problems similar to those found in DiDonato's reliance on Roe
appear when the court cites Stam v. State'33 as controlling. Stare in-
volved an abortion question arising under two state constitutional provi-
sions guaranteeing rights similar to those guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Stare based its
holding that a "fetus" is not a "person" within the meaning of the North
Carolina Constitution article I, sections 1 and 19 on both the probable
intent of the framers of the constitution, as well as the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the similar wording in the United
States Constitution. 134 After examining such intent, the court concluded
that the framers of the North Carolina Constitution did not intend to
include "fetus" within the meaning of the word "person" in the constitu-
tional provisions.1 35 In addition, the Stain court noted that the current
state of medical knowledge involving fetal development is far more ad-
vanced than it was at-the time the state constitution was adopted in the
eighteenth century.'36 However, according to Stam, if these medical ad-
vancements controlled the court's decision, "fetus" would take on a new
meaning which would indirectly conflict with the holding in Roe v.
Wade."37 Likewise, the change in the legal status of the fetus which such
advancements would create should be recognized by the courts. Recog-
nizing a fetus as a "person" within the meaning of the Wrongful Death
Act would further the remedial purpose of the statute without conflicting
with the decision in the factually dissimilar Roe v. Wade. Moreover, the
North Carolina General Assembly has already recognized the rights of
the unborn in provisions other than the Wrongful Death Act and has
131. Comment, supra note 29, at 1674.
132. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65.
133. 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980).
134. Id. at 214, 267 S.E.2d at 340.
135. Id. at 217-18, 267 S.E.2d at 342.
136. Id. at 217, 267 S.E.2d at 341.
137. Id.
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intimated a desire to protect those rights.'3 Courts should not hesitate
to protect these important rights.
Finally, the majority in DiDonato holds that the legislature, not the
judiciary should expand "person" to include the word "fetus" within the
meaning of the wrongful death statute. 3 9 Again, the problems surface
under this rationale. As courts in other jurisdictions have stated, deny-
ing recovery where a fetus is stillborn prevents effectuation of the legisla.
tive intent, sanctions the tortfeasor's wrongful act and negates the
primary objective of the statute. 14 An Alabama court faced with the
argument that the legislature is the appropriate forum for deciding
whether recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus exclaimed that it is
"often necessary for [the judiciary] to breathe life into existing laws less
they become stale and shelfworn."'
14'
CONCLUSION
Now that over two-thirds of the American jurisdictions allow recovery
for the wrongful death of unborn fetuses (some requiring viability), the
trend will eventually reflect itself in the laws of North Carolina.
Although it is up to the legislature to make the laws, it is for the courts to
interpret them. With no explicit exclusion of the viable unborn fetus in
the statutory use of "person" in § 28A-18-2, it would appear that the
North Carolina Supreme Court's grant of certiorari to hear plaintiff-ap-
pellant's appeal in DiDonato v. Wortman, the reversal of the lower
court's decision, and the broadening of the statutory definition of "per-
son" to include a viable unborn fetus, would be an appropriate forum in
which to begin that trend.
HOLLY B. BROWN
SEGA P. HOWELL
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-5 (1984). An unborn infant may take an estate by deed or
writing.
139. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 119, 267 S.E.2d at 60.
140. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974) (plaintiff sued defendant
for the wrongful death of an 8.5 month-old fetus caused by defendant's negligence in an automobile
accident).
141. Id. at 99, 300 So. 2d 357.
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